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This article traces the U.K.s tepid response to the recent refugee cri-
sis confronting Europe today and reviews Britains approach to pro-
vide sanctuary from its ideological/historical origins to its policy
enactments over time (1905-2016). That approach resonates with the
deep tensions the issue of immigration raises within the nation state
and the intense uncoupling of refuge and sanctuary from its humani-
tarian initiatives. We juxtapose the U.K. governments engagement
with the refugee crisis against its “tradition of humanitarianism” in
which Britain has idealized itself as sanctuary to those who have fled
from persecution, torture, or conflict. This historic ideal of refuge
has been challenged with numerous immigration and asylum-related
policies as well as increased securitization of border controls in
response to the changing political context since 1905. We argue that
“sanctuary” is a diminished and contentious component of its pre-
sent-day humanitarianism involving increased securitization and asy-
lum policies with stringent immigration controls. We trace the U.K.s
harsh and restrictive stance toward the refugee and the asylum seeker
through a series of policies from the Aliens Act in 1905 to the Dubs
Amendment of 2016 which seek to delegitimize refugees, enact
tighter barriers to entry, and cast them as economic “migrants” and
as suspect figures in a post-9/11 world.
Keywords: Immigration Policy, Refugees, Refugee Crisis, Migration, Asy-
lum Seekers, Sanctuary, United Kingdom, Great Britain, British Immigra-
tion History, 1905-2016, Brexit, Border Control, Humanitarianism,
Acknowledgements: We are grateful for the careful reading and constructive comments of the
P&P reviewers in strengthening this article from its earlier version. We are also indebted to the
Editor, Prof. David Mena Aleman, for his invaluable counsel and clear directions in refining
this article.
Politics & Policy, Volume 46, No. 3 (2018): 348-391. 10.1111/polp.12254
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
VC 2018 Policy Studies Organization
Europe, European Union, Border Controls, Theresa May, Racialized Dis-
course, Othering, Aliens 1905, Humanitarian Crisis, Calais, Calais Jungle,
Refuge.
Related Articles:
Duman, Yoav H. 2014. “Reducing the Fog? Immigrant Regularization
and the State.” Politics & Policy 42 (2): 187-220. http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12065/abstract
McKay, Fiona H., Lucy Hall, and Kehla Lippi. 2017. “Compassionate
Deterrence: A Howard Government Legacy.” Politics & Policy 45 (2):
169-193. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12198/abstract
Silverman, Stephanie J. 2012. “Regrettable but Necessary? A Historical
and Theoretical Study of the Rise of the U.K. Immigration Detention
Estate and Its Opposition.” Politics & Policy 40 (6): 1131-1157. http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00393.x/abstract
Related Media:
Gentleman, Amelia. 2015. “What Crime Have I Committed to be Held
Like This?: Yarls Wood.” The Guardian. March 3. https://www.theguar-
dian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/03/inside-yarls-wood-detention-centre-asylum-
seekers-abuse-suicide
Polachowska, Maria. 2012. “Kindertransport: A Journey to Life.” BBC
Newsnight. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v5XqP0uVSj3bQ
UNHCR. 2017. “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016.” http://
www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-dis-
placement-2016.html
Este artículo recuenta la respuesta poco entusiasta del Reino Unido
para la reciente crisis de refugiados que Europa enfrenta actualmente
y revisa la aproximacion de los britanicos de proporcionar un san-
tuario desde sus orígenes ideologicos e historicos, hasta sus promul-
gaciones políticas entre los a~nos 1905 y 2016. Esa aproximacion
resuena con las tensiones profundas que estan en el tema de la
inmigracion dentro del estado nacion y la separacion intensa del san-
tuario y sus iniciativas humanitarias. Yuxtaponemos la participacion
del gobierno del Reino Unido en la crisis de refugiados con su
tradicion humanitaria en la que el Reino Unido se ha idealizado
como un santuario para los que han escapado la persecucion, la tor-
tura o el conflicto. El ideal historico del refugiado ha sido cuestio-
nado con numerosas políticas de inmigracion y asilo, así como una
seguridad incrementada de los controles de frontera en respuesta al
contexto político cambiante desde 1905. Argumentamos que
santuario es un componente reducido y controvertido de su calidad
humanitaria de hoy en día que involucra una seguridad y políticas de
asilo incrementadas con controles migratorios mas estrictos. Esque-
matizamos la posicion dura y restrictiva del Reino Unido hacia el
refugiado y el solicitante de asilo a traves de una serie de políticas
del Aliens Act en 1905 al Dubs Amendment de 2016 que buscan
deslegitimar a los refugiados, establecer barreras mas firmes en
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contra de su ingreso y tratarlos como migrantes economicos y figu-
ras sospechosas en un mundo post 11 de septiembre.
Palabras Clave: Política de Inmigracion, Refugio, Refugiado, Asilo, Reino
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The recent refugee crisis confronting Europe has thrown up various chal-
lenges, both for the European Union and its member states, and is likely to con-
tinue with an estimated one million refugees heading for Libya and Europe
from countries across Africa (Wintour 2017). For the United Kingdom, like
other countries, providing asylum to refugees and entry to migrants have
become national issues coloring internal debates and bringing its legal and
social obligations as part of the European Union or the European community
into question. The 2016 referendum on the European Union underscored the
issue of immigration as an epoch-defining political issue (Wadsworth et al.
2016), one which both the “remain” and “exit” camps seized on as a means to
rally popular opinion and support for their respective manifestos. In the pro-
cess, these have shed an introspective light on the U.K.s contemporary policies
and notions of humanitarian refuge with their roots in ancient religious practi-
ces of sanctuary.
Such introspection comes at a critical juncture as the world faces its
“biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time” (Ban Ki Moon, cited in
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 2016, 4) with
forced migration reaching record post-war levels. In 2015, the numbers had
risen to 65.3 million people worldwide, representing an increase of 10 percent
from the previous year. An escalation in political conflict and religious
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persecution from Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia to Iraq and Afghanistan have led
to over a million people—or a four-fold increase from the previous year—cross-
ing into Europe in search of sanctuary, presenting the European continent with
its biggest refugee-based humanitarian crisis since World War II (UNHCR
2016).
In the first half of the twentieth century, international refugee law was
country specific but after World War II and within the context of the new
United Nations (UN), the present system for the protection of refugees as a uni-
versal system came into existence. It comprised the UNHCR formed in 1950
and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1951 Convention.
These defined the refugee and the rights attached to that status. According to
the 1951 Convention,
the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who. . . as a result of events
occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a national-
ity and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.1
The universal scope of the Convention was limited by both space and tem-
porality wherein the recognition of refugee status is underpinned only in rela-
tion to events that occurred in Europe and before January 1, 1951. The
definition of the refugee was expanded to include anyone who, if expelled,
would face a real risk of exposure “to torture, or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment” with the adoption of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. The UN Refugee Convention 1951 excluded those sus-
pected as war criminals and terrorists as warranting protection. However, Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated
into U.K. law through the Human Rights Act of 1998, nevertheless prohibited
their deportation if in the event they faced a real risk of degrading or inhumane
treatment (Gibney 2011). The main distinction between refugees and asylum
seekers is in terms of security of residence. Once an asylum seeker is accepted as
a refugee, she is generally free from the threat of removal and with the issue of
a refugee passport by the Home Office, she could leave and return to Britain
and have the right to have her family join her.
Britains notion of a humanitarian ethic toward the persecuted and the pro-
vision of refuge predates contemporary international human rights law or inter-
national refugee law. In the nineteenth century, the sense of a distinctive British
1 See Article 1(A)(2) of the 2016 Convention at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html
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tradition of humanitarian refuge emerged out of older religious practices of
sanctuary, which enabled the nation to imagine itself as morally superior, enno-
bled, and more enlightened than its European counterparts (Rabben 2011;
Shaw 2015). The tradition emerged in propitious circumstances of open borders
where people were generally able to come and go as they pleased with these
informal policies distinguishing Britain from its European counterparts. How-
ever, with mass forced migration and the loss of empire in the twentieth cen-
tury, borders became increasingly politicized, and control over who could enter
marked an overt assertion of sovereign power and a measure of the effective-
ness, or otherwise, of government policies. As such, the U.K.s historic humani-
tarian ideal of being a sanctuary for the persecuted became uncoupled from its
open borders approach. The 1905 Aliens Act not only reinstated border con-
trols, it also for the first time defined refuge in British law and created legal pro-
tocols for asylum and as such formalized the British tradition of humanitarian
refuge (Bashford and McAdam 2014). In reality, the Act marked the beginning
of a moral and material contestation of this ideal over the next 120 years as
issues of immigration, border control, membership of the European Union, and
securitization issues would test its commitment to the romantic myth of being a
safe haven for the displaced and persecuted, leading to an increased racializa-
tion, stigmatization, and fear of the Other.
We draw from a strong body of literature on the ideal and historic practices
of sanctuary and humanitarian refuge in the United Kingdom and, in particu-
lar, the role of the state both in terms of its rhetoric and material enactments in
terms of policy provisions as well as diplomatic gestures in times of war and
conflict (see Rabben 2011; Shaw 2015). This article traces the demise of the
ideal through a succession of increasingly restrictive policies on immigration
and asylum. Today, with a dramatic rise in numbers of refugees displaced due
to forced migration, particularly with the unresolved situation of refugees in
Calais and in the Mediterranean, the U.K.s historic-romantic and moral posi-
tion of being a safe haven remains a myth. The U.K.s tepid response to the ref-
ugee crisis bears the teeth marks of ever more restrictive asylum and refugee
policies over the years. Key mechanisms for contracting humanitarian refuge
have seen the coalescing of asylum and refuge with stringent immigration poli-
cies. This has led to the stigmatizing of asylum seekers as fraudulent or oppor-
tunistic and suspect figures attracted to the “generous” U.K. welfare system.
The attitudes toward immigration have, over the years, been shaped by the
U.K.s relationship with its former colonies and equally its membership of the
European Union that has witnessed an influx of European migrants at different
points in time. The role of subsequent governments in reducing the provisions
for asylum seekers both in their immediate access to legal assistance and welfare
reflects the increased subsuming of refuge under immigration control measures
within the United Kingdom. In the contemporary context, against the austerity
politics of the Conservative government, the refugee is portrayed as both a
threat to national security and contributing to the shortage of housing and
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welfare at large. As such, the control of border space is tightly entwined with
the domestic politics of disaffection. The U.K.s response to the humanitarian
crisis in Calais and the Mediterranean has been through a distant or nonproxi-
mate approach by increasing securitization at the borders and outsourcing bor-
der controls and aid to other countries or verifying the authenticity of their
claims of persecution at the countries of origin rather than in Europe. Today,
immigration policy and immigration controls are seen as vital to electoral suc-
cess; and in tandem successive governments since the turn of the 1900s have
cumulatively restricted their obligations to the Other as a means to assuage
domestic politics.
With the demise of the empire, withdrawal of rights and obligations to the
former colonies, the formation of the European Union, and the recent referen-
dum in Britain to leave the European Union, the notions of refuge and political
sanctuary remain an area of intense scrutiny and fear, welded to the politics of
welfare, employment, racialization of immigration, British identity, and state
sovereignty. It was a pivotal issue in the Brexit referendum in 2016 where the
decision to leave the European Union was in many ways framed as a means for
Britain to regain control over its borders. The provision of asylum, while inte-
gral to the imagination of the nation as humane and compassionate, has over
time been mediated by the politics of race and the nation space; prescribing
who is admitted and who is cast out, and equally how the entrants may be a
threat to both the coffers and values of the nation state. The different waves of
the refugee crisis have been a testing ground for the British historical ideal of
providing sanctuary. The refugee crisis in Calais and the Mediterranean became
a theater for this contracted humanitarianism which has been ongoing since the
turn of the twentieth century. The refuge element, which was historically con-
joined to Britains humanitarianism, became rapidly mediated and uncoupled
particularly after World War II.
The U.K.s response to the present refugee crisis needs to be politically and
historically contextualized where the figure of the refugee has been reconsti-
tuted through policy enactments over time. This article examines the British
governments engagement with the latest refugee crisis against its
“humanitarian tradition” of providing asylum or sanctuary to those from con-
flict zones or whose lives are deemed to be at risk. In assessing how the United
Kingdom responds to the present forced migration and refugee crisis, this arti-
cle traces the humanitarian “tradition” in British history, providing an historic
overview to assess the policies enacted by the United Kingdom to deal with the
refugee within the ambit of immigration and asylum policies. These cumulative
enactments and legislation were intended to retain the provision of sanctuary
while regulating the processes of admission and deterrence provide a context in
which to analyze the present refugee crises and to locate Britains
“nonproximate” or externalization approach where there is an outsourcing of
the crisis (i.e., in processing asylum applications, detention, repatriation, and
border patrol) to external partners far away from its border space. We argue
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that the figure of the present-day refugee is a historically mediated entity con-
ceived through the romantic myth of safe sanctuary. In reality refugees and asy-
lum seekers are bodies which are constantly disciplined and curtailed. They
remain indexical symbols of Britains historic tradition of humanitarianism but
are products of years of policies which commit to a politics of attrition of both
the conception of her as human and her rights.
Ancient, European, and International Contexts
The “humanitarian gesture” as the “will to alleviate suffering” is prevalent
across time and space in most societies, cultures, and religions (Davey, Borton,
and Foley 2013). The Western origins can be traced to the sanctuary practices
of the ancient world, which offered refuge to those fleeing for their lives in the
name of the gods and in sacred spaces.2 These practices emerged through a
combination of pity for those whose plight one could share tomorrow and fear
that failure to provide sanctuary could incur the wrath of the gods.
The Romans in the fourth-century AD and then the Catholic church fused
classical and Judeo-Christian practices into a codification of practices, and a
common understanding of sanctuary suffused through their network across
Europe for over 1,000 years (Rabben 2011). By the Middle Ages, sanctuary had
become one of the most important and powerful institutions in medieval Europe
(Shoemaker 2011b), but codification also brought exclusion. While the Greeks
offered sanctuary to runaway slaves, political activists, and fugitives from justice
(Gorman 1994), Roman and Papal codes excluded Jews, heretics, and apostates
(Rabben 2011). In medieval Europe, fugitives were at the mercy of local bishops
who had the discretion to intercede on their behalf and offer sanctuary (Shoe-
maker 2011b). By the seventeenth century, the associated power and discretion-
ary abuses had brought the practices into disrepute and the churches began
dismantling their codes (Shoemaker 2011) and the nation state increasingly
assumed responsibility for the provision of refuge within its borders.3 The reli-
gious practices of sanctuary were replaced by secular practices of humanitarian
2The English word sanctuary is derived from the Latin sanctuariummeaning “sacred place, shrine”
and the Hebrew sanctum (Online Dictionary of Etymology; https://www.etymonline.com/word/
sanctuary). The related word, asylum, meaning a “place of refuge, sanctuary,” is from the Greek
asylonmeaning “refuge, fenced territory.” Literally it meant an “inviolable place,” and from 1712,
it meant “inviolable shelter, protection from pursuit or arrest.”
3 Sanctuary as a religious practice continued in some of the Mediterranean states until the nine-
teenth century. It was revived by the Papacy inWorldWar II when the Vatican, as a city state, pro-
vided exit routes first for Jews and then Nazi fugitives at the end of the war. The religious practices
have also been revived in the Sans Papiers Movement in France in which some of the churches in
the late 1990s offered refuge to the undocumented migrants (Freedman 2008) and the Sanctuary
movement in the United States, a religious and political campaign in the 1980s to provide humani-
tarian refuge for Central American refugees fleeing civil conflict. The movement was a form of
resistance against increasingly restrictive immigration policies that made obtaining asylum more
difficult.
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refuge, driven by an imperative to alleviate suffering rather than out of fear for
the wrath of God in failing to offer sanctuary, and the discretion of ministers
replaced that of the bishops. The legacies of the Roman and medieval practices
continued in a common, romanticized notion of sanctuary but, with the shift in
responsibility to the state from the seventeenth century, the “international”
dimension of the practices fragmented and differentiated around national imper-
atives. Fragmentation made possible the emergence of a distinctive British tradi-
tion in the hiatus between the decline of religious practices and the reinstatement
of border controls in the nineteenth century (Shaw 2015).
War, ethnic cleansing, and genocide in the twentieth century exposed the
humanitarian consequences of fragmentation and discretion in practices of refuge.
Europe was horrified by the unprecedented levels of displacement and suffering, and
the figure of the refugee emerged as an international subject in need of protection
(Cabanes 2014; Panayi and Virdee 2011). After World War I, a new moral impera-
tive appeared for the international codification of humanitarian refuge and its prac-
tices. While those displaced by war, conflict and persecution had long been known
as refugees, it was “not self-evident who could be formally classified as a refugee” or
what system might provide for refuge (Sallinen 2013, 1). The work started by the
League of Nations was interrupted by the Second World War and resumed again
under the aegis of the UN. The conventions and protocols adopted between 1948
and 1961 encoded the definition and rights of the refugee into contemporary interna-
tional agreements that have increasingly been written into European Union and
British law. Not only is Britain a signatory of these international agreements, the
involvement of its lawyers in the drafting of the UN ones played a key role in the
romanticized imagining of a distinctive British tradition of humanitarianism (David
Milliband, quoted in Borger 2015). The international agreements revived much
older understandings of the provision of a refuge for those fleeing for their lives.
The primary concern in Europe after the war was the potential power of
states to abuse citizens. ECHR (1953) evolved to address this backed by the
legal power of the Strasbourg Court whose rulings are binding.4 The initial
focus on the citizen and the right of the sovereign state to determine who might
cross its borders meant that the ECHR was slow to consider cases involving ref-
ugees5 and to a large extent it was some of the other European agreements that
4While the European Convention and the Strasbourg Court have privileged the citizen and the
right of the sovereign state to determine who may enter its borders, the American counterparts
(American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) have
prioritized the “plight of migrants such as the refugee in search of asylum and the foreigner born
without a nationality” (Dembour 2015, 22).
5Dembour (2015, 23) cites the East Asians case brought after the British government in 1968 virtu-
ally overnight introduced legislation that stripped Asian holders of British passports, being
expelled from Kenya, the right to live in Britain. The case was not heard by the court but a confi-
dential European Commission in 1973, which concluded that the legislation was racially motivated
and contravened the European Convention (Article 3) which prohibits inhuman or degrading
treatment.
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shaped the development of European Union law on border controls, immigra-
tion, and asylum. The Schengen Agreement (1995) allowed for the free move-
ment of people, trade, and capital between signatory states, and the
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) laid out the intention to develop common immigra-
tion and asylum policies with a view to harmonizing both (Costello and Han-
cox 2014).6
Britain has consistently maintained a position of exceptionalism, opting out
of European Union agreements on free movement, asylum and immigration,
and the removal of illegal migrants. However, successive governments have
opted for measures to strengthen border controls, policing, and securitization
including the right of states to fine companies that carry undocumented stow-
aways into the country. Britain also opted into directives on the Dublin Regula-
tions which obliges an application for asylum to be made in the first country of
entry to the European Union7 and on the removal of irregular migrants to third
countries. Much of the legislative activity explored in our analysis incorporates
some of these measures into British law and the increasing restrictions and bar-
riers to entry.
Underlying this bewildering array of opt-ins and opt-outs under the
European Union, there has been a clear rationale behind British selectivity
in choosing those policies that “reinforce rather than overturn established
patterns” in domestic policy (Geddes 2005, 723), accepting the more coer-
cive elements that restrict entry and strengthen border controls while opt-
ing out of more protective measures—for instance, on family reunion
(Fletcher 2009, 81). Selectivity has enabled Britain in the contemporary
refugee crisis to refuse its “quota” of asylum seekers already in the Euro-
pean Union. Under the Dublin Regulations, which require refugees to
apply for asylum in the first country they enter, the United Kingdom can
return refugees to whichever European Union country they traveled
through to reach Britain.8 The opt-out of the Schengen Agreement also
enables Britains external border controls to be sited on the French-
Belgium side of the English Channel.
Overall, the opt-ins and opt-outs have meant there has been some conver-
gence but also much leeway between Britain and other European Union states
6 The treaties, agreements, and protocols have gradually been writing the Refugee Convention into
European Union law (Costello andHancox 2014).
7 The Dublin Regulations have been constantly revised. Dublin III provided more opportunities
for family members to request a transfer to other member states in order to be together and have
their claims considered in the same country. The Regulations also privileged the “best interests” of
the child and “respect for family life” and made special provision for unaccompanied minors.
UNHCR, in response to the European Unions review of Dublin III, called for a more “proactive
and efficient use” of the Articles on family unity, unaccompaniedminors, and dependants (Refugee
Council 2015).
8Dublin Regulations, a “safe third country,” available online at https://righttoremain.org.uk/tool-
kit/dublin.html
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in practices of dispersal, detention, and deportation of asylum seekers (Costello
and Hancox 2014) as well as in the forced co-opting of industry to assist in the
detection of stowaways.9 Notwithstanding Britains exceptionalism and Euro-
pean Union attempts at harmonizing border controls, when it comes to migra-
tion and asylum, states have remained “the most influential” in determining
policies on entry, settlement, and integration of asylum seekers and refugees
(Kofman 2002).
Humanitarianism, Humanitarian Refuge, and a “Distinctive”
British Tradition
The term “humanitarian,” while difficult to date, came into common par-
lance in the early nineteenth century to refer to a range of activities intended to
protect and improve humanity (Barnett 2011). Although the “humanitarian
gesture” as the “will to alleviate suffering” is an ancient one and global in that
it can be found in most societies, cultures, and religions (Davey, Borton, and
Foley 2013), it has nevertheless been presented as embodying the values of an
“Enlightened West” (Egeland 2011). Humanitarianism as rooted in a moral
imperative to act emerged out of nineteenth-century ideals circulating in
Europe; however, distinctive traditions were shaped by historical and political
conditions in different countries (Barnett and Weiss 2011). In the twentieth cen-
tury, humanitarian action has become most commonly associated with the
activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society. Yet there
is also a sizeable literature on the long history of state involvement in humani-
tarian interventions, through diplomacy or force, in foreign states (see Simms
and Trim 2011) to alleviate suffering and in the provision of humanitarian ref-
uge (see Shaw 2015). Our focus is on the latter.
During the middle to late nineteenth century, a distinctive British tradition
of offering refuge to strangers emerged (Shaw 2015), and by the mid-nineteenth
century, the meaning of the term had expanded to include anyone who fled per-
secution for religious or political reasons (Bashford and McAdam 2014; Shaw
2015). Despite the U.K.s secular national identity in modern history, its con-
ception of humanitarian refuge can be traced back to the religious meaning of
sanctuary rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions. As religious practices gave way
to secular ones, the imagination of refuge as a vital aspect of the British psyche
and tradition remained through time (Borger 2015; Shaw 2015) and became a
9 Post-Brexit, the British government has committed to retain all existing European Union law
already adopted and to reviewing it over time. Given Britains highly selective approach to border
controls, asylum, and immigration as a member of the European Union and the complexity of the
Irish border, it is unclear what is likely to change. There has been debate in France about pushing
the border controls back to Britain but whether that is practicable, given the Eurotunnel, is open to
question. The policy situation is too unstable to be able to speculate at this stage.
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resonant theme in the collective imagination of the nation and that of the
empire.
A primary aspect of humanitarianism is the response to crisis or emergen-
cies where sudden and unforeseen events demand urgent action to alleviate suf-
fering and save the lives of large numbers of people. There are also ongoing
crises that call for direct intervention to arrest a deteriorating condition. The
core principles derived from the humanitarian ideals and their underpinning
human values of empathy for humanity at large provided a means to imagine
and project Britain as having a higher moral imperative, as being more enlight-
ened and evolved than its more despotic European counterparts (Shaw 2015).
The notions of sanctuary and humanitarian refuge, while rooted in mythologi-
cal and religious traditions in the nineteenth century, enacted the provision of
refuge through the binary of the host and guest—inscribing power, moral supe-
riority, and patronage to the act of refuge. The modern-day conceptions of
humanitarianism emerging in the mid-nineteenth century through Enlightenment
discourses lobbied for the conjoining of concerted action and moral responsibility
with human compassion. In Victorian Britain, theological ideas, enlightenment
ideals, debates around antislavery, and administration of the empire dialectically
coalesced with the U.K.s moral imperative for the nation to be a safe space or
refuge for the persecuted (Shaw 2015; Skinner and Lester 2012).
The U.K.s notion of humanitarianism, particularly the provision of asylum
to the dispossessed Other, has been tested over time in history. From the heyday
of the empire to the present day, the notion of giving humanitarian refuge has
been an arena that has witnessed a vast array of policy enactments to contain
and control the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. As such, the “refugee sys-
tem” represents the policy domain that determines the status of refugee claimants
and assists in the settlement of those individuals granted asylum (Laumann and
Knoke 1987). It encompasses the formation and implementation of policies and
practices that relate to the rights of individuals to claim asylum, the procedures
whereby claimants are awarded asylum, and the support provided to claimants
and refugees. Over the years, the retention of the clause to provide humanitarian
refuge to the displaced or those fleeing from persecution has been fiercely scruti-
nized, debated, and protected in parliament and in the media. The cumulative
policy enactments since the turn of the century throw light onto the dissonance
between ideals and policies designed to curb immigration and asylum.
The imperative to restrict refuge—despite retaining it as a definitive element
of its humanitarianism—gained momentum and impetus at different points
over time, reflecting global politics, domestic opposition to people coming into
the United Kingdom, and Britains ambition to carve a moral role for itself
after the demise of the empire. Asylum was reframed as a “problem” and suc-
cessive British governments have chafed under their internal obligations to refu-
gees as migration became an election issue, the number of asylum applications
mounted, backlogs grew, and debates shifted from issues of refuge to the cost
of dealing with asylum seekers. Terrorism added a potent element to the mix.
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The United Kingdom over time tightened asylum procedures making it harder
to obtain the legal status of a refugee and easier for the state to deport unsuc-
cessful applicants.
Successive governments since then have invested heavily in tighter security
at continental ports and the resistance to taking in more migrants is thus part of
a long-term contraction in humanitarianism toward asylum seekers. Two of the
most important conventions relating to refugees and asylum seekers—the 1951
Geneva Convention and the ECHR—only became part of British domestic law
in 2000 (Schuster and Solomos 2001, 1). Until the 1993 Asylum and Immigra-
tion Appeals Act, the process of granting refugee status or asylum was not regu-
lated by primary legislation but under procedural rules which gave the
government a high degree of discretion and flexibility over who would be
admitted or refused. The convention as such was a malleable instrument that
was interpreted to fit the needs and interests of the government of the day
(Schuster and Solomos 1999). These enactments to restrict asylum are divided
into six phases in our analysis, and the primary modes of restriction are the
main points of our focus in this trajectory.
1826-1905: Open Borders
The United Kingdom in the nineteenth century followed the religious prin-
ciple of providing sanctuary in sacred sites to anyone who needed it. This policy
was facilitated by an 80-year lapse of the 1836 Aliens Act and the passage of
the new Aliens Act in 1905. During this period, there were virtually no border
controls, no laws distinguishing refugees, and as such any foreigner could enter
Britain freely, and refugees were entitled to relief from the Poor Law,10 or the
workhouse (Shaw 2015). The normative assumption that a dignified existence
should be accorded to the refugee, encompassing political and humanitarian
sympathy as well as a physical sanctuary, became part of the common cause in
advancing liberty worldwide (Barnett 2011; Barnett and Weiss 2011; Shaw
2015). During a century of revolution, while other relatively free states such as
Belgium, France, and Switzerland11 extradited political and religious refugees
who were seen as politically inconvenient or embarrassing and introduced
increasing restrictive laws that made European countries “increasingly inhospi-
table to refugees” (Rabben 2011, 61), Britain resisted the trend to follow suit
(Shaw 2015). Instead, she allowed the politically and socially displaced,
10 From Elizabethan times, the English welfare system was based on the Poor Law originally
administered and financed by church parishes and overseen by the courts, but a series of reforms
from the 1830s meant that a central Poor Law bureaucracy was established. The definition of who
was an “outsider” changed from those who were outside the parish to those who were immigrants
(Feldman 2006), particularly after the 1905 Act.
11 Britain replaced Switzerland in the European firmament of humanitarian refuge. The Swiss gov-
ernment viewed asylum as a “humanitarian concession” that it could revoke or refuse but when the
country attracted revolutionaries, Switzerland expelled them and England became the “most sig-
nificant asylum-granting country” in Europe (Rabben 2011, 61).
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including Russian anarchists, Hungarian nationalists, French emigres as well as
Catholics, Protestants, and Jews to enter and remain. There was popular public
commitment to the notion that refugees were entitled to more than a temporary
stay of relief but also a dignified existence (Shaw 2015).
European moral philosophies in the Enlightenment period played an impor-
tant role in shaping the ideas of humanitarianism. Immanuel Kant expanded
on the idea that all human beings should be treated as free and equal by adding
a categorical imperative or unbreakable moral rule that “every rational being”
should be treated as an end in themselves and not a means to an end (Stoecker
2011). This constituted a powerful ethical critique of slavery and contributed to
the emergence of the antislavery movement, widely seen as a precursor to a
form of humanitarianism which seeks to address the structural causes of suffer-
ing (Barnett and Weiss 2011). Social reformists of the nineteenth century and
human rights advocates of the twentieth century drew on these ideas that were
institutionalized in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights (Barnett and
Weiss 2011). Kants cosmopolitan law was also influential as it emphasized the
status of individuals as human beings in their dealings with states of which they
are not citizens, premising their “right to hospitality” (Kleingeld 1998).
1905-60: Retention of Humanitarian Refuge despite Unease
British willingness to offer refuge began shifting between 1880 and 1914
with the forced migration of Jews fleeing religious persecution in Eastern
Europe when about 150,000 settled in Britain (Bashford and McAdam 2014). It
gave rise to debates concerning how to regulate the entry and impact of large
numbers of refugees and the fundamental questions concerning who Britain
wanted and did not want to admit. The Aliens Act of 1905 defined for the first
time in British law the notion of the “undesirable immigrant” as “criminal ali-
ens, the destitute, the ill or the infirm” who would place a burden on the Poor
Law institutions and the emerging health and welfare systems (Bashford and
McAdam 2014).12 Although the Bill did not specify Jews, the debates concern-
ing it, particularly by Members of Parliament in the East End of London where
many of the Ashkenazi Jewry sought refuge, were anti-Semitic centering on
stereotypes about diseased and criminal “aliens” who had moved into depressed
areas of London (Bashford and McAdam 2014). The debates leading up to the
Aliens Act of 1905, infused by xenophobic and anti-Semitic discourses, pro-
duced legislation restricting entry and demarcating those worthy and not wor-
thy of asylum by distinguishing between those able to support themselves and
12 States and self-governing colonies around the world fromAmerica to South Africa and Australia
had from the 1880s begun to legislate against entry by “undesirable immigrants” but the target was
different. In Britain, the concern was to restrict the entry of destitute Jews fleeing repression in Rus-
sia and Eastern Europe. In these other countries and colonies, the intention was to restrict Chinese
migrants attracted to the gold rushes (Bashford and McAdam 2014). The principle, though, was
the beginnings of immigration systems that differentiated between the wanted and the unwanted.
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those perceived as likely to “contaminate” the polity through poverty or disease
(Bashford and McAdam 2014; Kushner 2003).
Opponents of the Aliens Act of 1905 felt it undermined Britains distinctive
identity as a refuge from tyranny of persecution on religious or political
grounds. In response to these strands of debates, the Act retained the right to
asylum, framing it as an individual right of entry for those fleeing political or
religious persecution. In so doing, the Act for the first time enshrined in law the
category of the “refugee,” defined as those at risk of persecution for political or
religious reasons (Bashford and McAdam 2014).13 The 1905 Aliens Act made a
seminal connection between immigration and welfare; in particular, the concept
of “recourse to public funds” was introduced (Miles and Cleary 1993). This was
to remain a contentious aspect of policy making for years to come. The human-
itarian ideal of offering refuge remained a key aspect of the British psyche in
this period and can in large measure be traced to Britains role as an empire
and the Queens role as a protector of citizens—under this vast empire—and
acting in their best interest.
1960-90: The Commonwealth and the Politics of Race
Since 1945, there has been a tendency to equate the “immigrant” with black
people and ethnic minorities in popular discourse whether they have the formal
designation of migrants or have the legal status of refugee (Cohen 1994; Miles
1989; Miles and Cleary 1993). In tandem, the admission of refugees has been
influenced by the conjoining of “race” with immigration in the United King-
dom. With the breakup of the empire and self-rule in former colonies from the
1950s and 1960s, the United Kingdom sought to reduce its residual obligations
with former colonies or in according them special rights.
During this period, a raft of policies toward former colonies and subjects
delineated a racialized approach to immigration (i.e., the Commonwealth Act
of 1962 and 1968, and the Immigration Act of 1971), restricted entry, and iden-
tified “undesirable” elements based on racial grounds while retaining the right
to asylum. These restrictions culminated in the 1968 law which specifically tar-
geted blacks and Asians facing increased discrimination in newly liberated
states (Hansen 1999, 2003). In 1968, an Act rushed through parliament in just
three days left some 200,000 Asians expelled from Kenya stateless after Britain
and India refused entry. In theory, they should have been able to claim the pro-
tection of the British state. However, rather than honor international obliga-
tions under the 1951 Convention or their duties to British citizens, the British
government chose to withdraw the right of entry and settlement from that
group by introducing the concept of “patriality” in the 1968 Commonwealth
Immigrants Act: “any citizen of Britain or its colonies who held a passport
13 The codifying of the individual right to asylum from persecution was “unique” and predates the
later international treaties (Bashford andMcAdam 2014).
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issued by the British government would be subject to immigration control
unless they or at least one parent or grandparent was born, adopted, naturalised
or registered in Britain as a citizen of Britain or its colonies” (Solomos 1993,
66).
The immigration Acts between 1962 and 1988 not only eroded rights of entry
to Asian and black people but also curtailed the citizenship rights of former colo-
nial subjects bringing virtually all primary migration to an end (Bloch 2000). It
curtailed the entry for settlement into the United Kingdom to family reunion
cases and to refugees and asylum seekers. The Immigration Act of 1988 ended
the right to automatic entry of dependants of Commonwealth citizens who set-
tled before 1973, marking the end of much of the immigration from Common-
wealth countries. The Act also specified that families could only be united if there
was no recourse to public funds, solidifying a link which had already been made
earlier in the Aliens Act of 1905 (Bloch 2000; Miles and Cleary 1993). Further
reforms curtailing welfare have been justified under the basis that these are neces-
sary to deter those who might come to Britain on account of the perceptions of
generous welfare provisions (D€uvell and Jordan 2002).
The Immigration Act of 1971 deepened the racialization of immigration by
creating an exclusionary aspect to British citizenship based on the concept of
“patrials” and “nonpatrials” (Goulbourne 1998). This meant millions of white
Commonwealth citizens could, in theory, enter Britain under the patriality clause
while almost all non-white Commonwealth citizens were excluded by “racially
defined categories” (Spencer 1997, 143). This racial delineation was further aug-
mented by the National Act of 1981 that abolished citizenship through place of
birth (or jus soli) and replaced it with citizenship through descent or jus sanguinis.
This had the effect of excluding children born in Britain to Commonwealth
migrants from immediate entitlement to citizenship. It further created three catego-
ries of British citizenship, two of which (i.e., British Overseas Citizenship and Citi-
zenship of British Dependant Territories) were not entitled to the right of abode.
The introduction of visas in the 1980s as a response to outbreaks of conflict
affected both asylum seekers and people seeking family reunification (Cohen
1994; Morris 1998) and had an impact on Commonwealth citizens. In 1985, for
example, visa requirements were introduced for Sri Lankan nationals when
there was an increase in the numbers of asylum applicants from Sri Lanka. The
policy of restricting entry to the United Kingdom was reinforced by the
Carriers Liability Act 1987 where heavy fines were imposed on all carriers
transporting people to the United Kingdom without appropriate documenta-
tion. It placed the onus on airline and shipping companies to detect anyone
traveling with false and therefore illegal documents.
1990-2000: Firming Immigration Controls
The ongoing curbs on migration since the 1960s and the influx of large
numbers of those forcibly displaced by conflict in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
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and Iraq meant that asylum seekers were the main category of primary
migrants during the 1990s. Since then, there has been a proliferation of laws
intended to make the attaining of asylum and the lives of those seeking it in the
United Kingdom more uncomfortable (Gibney 2004) both in terms of entry
and in the area of welfare entitlements. It mirrored and prolonged the stance
taken with the East African Asians projecting haste in its endeavor to bar the
influx of refugees. The cross-party consensus was of an existing asylum system
that was inadequate in dealing with refugees, prompting calls for reform of the
system (Mulvey 2010). The refugee issue began to fall increasingly under immi-
gration control rather than the larger ambit of immigration policy (Kaye 1994).
The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was promulgated into
U.K. law as the first piece of primary legislation dealing specifically with asy-
lum since the 1905 Aliens Act. It incorporated the Refugee Convention into
British law but was shaped more by attempts to deter those seeking refugee
status in the United Kingdom than to help them (see Bashford and McAdam
2014; Keyes 2004). Increased restrictionism in the reception and integration
of those who do gain entry became the dominant characteristic of the refugee
policy framework (Zetter, Griffiths, and Sigona 2005, 171). The 1993 Act
was advanced as a means to speed up the processing of asylum applications,
but in reality the Act imposed harsh new measures on asylum seekers intend-
ing to deter them from arriving in the United Kingdom (Macdonald 1993).
These included the extension of the Carriers Liability Act to make airlines
responsible for ensuring transit visas to avoid transit passengers disembark-
ing in the United Kingdom and claiming asylum. Compulsory fingerprinting
was introduced along with the provision that asylum seekers had to appeal
against unfavorable decisions within 48 hours, and the statutory duty of local
authorities to provide social housing for asylum seekers if they had any form
of temporary accommodation was curtailed (Sales 2002).
The 1993 Act, although designed to reduce the number of people entering
the United Kingdom as refugees or asylum seekers, nevertheless sought to
incorporate the 1951 Convention and the introduction of a right of appeal
(Morris 2009). In 1998, the Human Rights Act was passed, which specifies that
no laws should be passed that contravene the ECHR and was critical in giving
British judges the opportunity to rule on the convention in British courts.14
Prior to this, human rights cases that fell under European Union law when all
avenues had been exhausted in Britain, had to be heard in the ECHR and even
there the numbers of asylum-related cases have been relatively few and only a
handful have been successful (Dembour 2015, 1). The tightening of immigra-
tion controls was deemed as necessary for good race relations (Minderhoud
14 Britain had been the first to ratify the ECHR in 1951 (Simpson 2004, 2, cited in Morris 2009,
222) and was already committed to the principles but the passing of the 1998 Human Rights Act
allowed British judges to rule on cases contravening the Convention in British courts (Morris
2009).
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1999; Spencer 1997). Just two years later in November 1995, the government
introduced the Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996.
The 1996 legislation curtailed welfare entitlements for some asylum seekers
by creating two categories of entitlement (Morris 2009). Asylum seekers who
had applied for asylum at the port of entry would be eligible for 90 percent of
the social security benefit income support. Conversely, those who applied in the
United Kingdom and those who were appealing against a Home Office decision
on their case were to be excluded from benefits although there were provisions
made for in-kind support from local authorities. The welfare provision in the
United Kingdom was seen as attracting economic migrants. Asylum seekers are
not allowed to apply for a work permit until they have been resident for six
months, which means that some have no access to social security benefits and
no legal entitlement to work on their arrival to Britain. Much of the responsibil-
ity for supporting destitute asylum seekers fell on local authorities (Kaye 1994),
who have a statutory duty to provide subsistence support for single asylum
seekers under the 1948 National Assistance Act and asylum-seeking families
under the 1989 Children Act. Local authorities are not allowed to provide cash
assistance to in-country asylum applicants under the 1948 Act but instead offer
supermarket vouchers and assistance “in kind,” such as food parcels and
clothes (Sales 2002).
The 1996 Act also included a clause relating to employment. Employers
found to have hired someone without the proper documentation would be sub-
jected to a penalty fine (Webber 2008). The 1996 Act saw the creation of the
“White List” of countries that were deemed to be safe.15 Applicants from these
countries were to be fast-tracked through the appeals process. This contravenes
the spirit of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees as the national-
ity of an asylum applicant should not affect the determination process. The
White List was later abolished by the Labour government.
While it was acknowledged that Britain had legal and humanitarian obliga-
tions to “genuine” asylum seekers under the 1951 Geneva Convention, there
was a consensus that “bogus” asylum seekers should be prevented from exploit-
ing the system (Kaye 1994). The “bogus” asylum applicant is a recurrent dis-
course in U.K. debates concerning immigration (Maughan 2010). Debates
surrounding the Asylum and Immigration Bill of 1996 were very similar to
those that had preceded the 1993 legislation converging around the dichotomy
between genuine and bogus asylum seekers and the need to stop the abuse of
15 The White List identified countries the Home Office deemed to be “generally safe” and present-
ing no “serious” risk of persecution (Schuster and Solomos 2001). The list allowed the government
to presume that asylum applications from those countries were likely to be unfounded therefore
could be fast-tracked and rejected unless the applicant could produce evidence to refute that (Bol-
ton 2003). The development of a White List was first adopted by European Union home affairs
ministers in 1992 (Migration News 1995) and strengthened in the 1996 Asylum and Immigration
Act (Keyes 2004).
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the system that occurred as a result of generous welfare entitlements (Maughan
2010).
The Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 ingrained a dual strategy of
restricting entry to the United Kingdom and reducing social citizenship rights
for asylum seekers (Bloch 2010). The Bill entered parliament at a time when the
Conservatives were critical of Labour, claiming that Tony Blairs government
was a “soft touch” for bogus asylum seekers (William Hague 2000, cited in
Maughan 2010, 16). It justified firmer controls as being crucial to the promo-
tion of race relations (Maughan 2010) and went on to extend the Carriers Lia-
bility Act by including trucking companies and train passenger services.
The Bill provided a new legal framework for the detention of asylum
seekers to combat illegal entry and strengthened the hand of the home secretary
by expanding powers to search, arrest, and detain asylum seekers (Sales 2002).
Under the 1999 Act, asylum seekers who have been waiting for more than five
years for their case to be heard may be granted indefinite leave to remain and
those who have been waiting for between three and five years will receive four
years leave to remain (Bloch and Schuster 2005). A new cashless voucher sys-
tem for asylum seekers was also introduced but abolished in 2002.16 The policy
sought to reduce the backlog of cases and introduced the forced dispersal of
asylum seekers to relieve the concentration of claimants living and working in
London and South-East England.17 The dispersal system was also perceived as
a form of social engineering where asylum seekers were dispersed to areas of
economic decline and elevated levels of crime and violence. In addition, local
authority administered welfare was linked to immigration status (Cohen 2002).
In 2000, the National Asylum Support Service was created to administer the
new system. The Act also increased the powers of immigration officers to arrest
and detain people, as well as expanded the use of immigration detention with
the capacity for detention quadrupling to 4,000 people at any time.
From 2000, Onward: Further Curbs
Tony Blair, faced with a surge of asylum cases that coincided with the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
16 The vouchers were not only controversial, the system was difficult to implement but the principle
that asylum seekers should not be incentivized by benefits was first mooted in 1999 and remained
intact until today (Singh 2010).
17 Britain was not unique in facing large backlogs in the asylum process. Germany had also grap-
pled with the problem in the mid-1990s and in both countries there was a tension between protec-
tions under due process and speedy, efficient decision making. Nor was Britain unusual in
adopting a dispersal scheme. France had in the 1970s decentralized its provision of hostel space
for asylum seekers around the country resulting in a “de facto dispersal” (Kofman 2002, 1043).
Italy, in the late 1990s, was unprepared for the considerable number of refugees fleeing the Bal-
kans crisis and adopted a mixed approach in which the state set up dispersed reception centers
primarily in small communities and NGOs also became involved in providing shelter (Kofman
2002).
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sought to dilute Britains commitments under international law. Unable to do
so under the ECHR without breaching the terms of Britains membership of
the European Union (Watt and Wintour 2015), Blair lobbied unsuccessfully
for the operational modernization of the 1951 Refugee Convention to keep
pace with a “changed” environment and a “vastly increased” number of asy-
lum seekers (Mulvey 2010, 440).18 When that failed, Blair adopted a two-
pronged strategy. First, he sought to protect refugees from the Balkans con-
flict through UN safe havens in the region, so they had no need to seek
humanitarian refuge in Britain (Sales 2005). The second comprised a raft of
British policy enactments after 2000 intended to further curb entry by dramat-
ically increasing surveillance and monitoring at the borders. These
“criminalized the process” of seeking asylum by limiting the citizenship rights
of refugees (Back et al. 2002).
The Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002 introduced many
radical measures including a provision to allow the children of failed asylum
seekers to be taken into care, restricting the remit of the Immigration Appeal
Tribunal (IAT) to errors of law (Webber 2008), and abolishing the automatic
right to a bail hearing.19 It repealed the provision of automatic bail hearings
created by the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999, granting wider powers to
those who authorize and extend bail to enter premises and detain (The Guard-
ian 2009b). This meant that an asylum seeker can be detained at any time dur-
ing their application, not just prior to removal. It again created a White List of
safe countries.20 This meant citizens of these designated countries who have
their asylum applications rejected could not remain in the United Kingdom
while they mounted an appeal. It also made provision to deport asylum seekers
to a safe-third country without appeal with the presumption that countries
newly admitted to the European Union would fall within the “safe” category
(Keyes 2004). A joint parliamentary committee described this as an
“unacceptable” threat to human rights and strongly criticized the enactment of
a provision that withdrew refugee protection from people convicted of serious
criminal offences as contrary to the U.K.s obligations under the Refugee Con-
vention, as it allowed deportation even for crimes that were not “particularly
serious” (The Guardian 2009b).
18 Blairs call for changes to international treaties on refugees echoed a similar one by Home Secre-
tary Jack Straw and controversial proposals by the Austrian government in 1998 (Gibney 2001).
19 There were successive attempts by the Labour government to restrict failed asylum seekers to a
single right of appeal and attempts to restrict access to higher courts. The measures were legally
challenged and had to be abandoned, but as Geoff Mulvey has argued, they remained policy goals
and symbols in a rhetoric of illegitimate applicants (2010).
20 The safe country of origin concept gives the home secretary power to designate a country “safe”
in that in general there is “no serious risk of persecution” to those living there and deportation there
would “not in general contravene” the European Convention. There is no appeal against designa-
tion but it may be challenged by judicial review (Refugee Council n.d.).
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One of the most controversial aspects of the Act was the decision to remove
support for destitute asylum seekers who would now have to prove that they
were destitute and that the application for asylum had been made “as soon as
reasonably practicable” upon arrival in the United Kingdom (Keyes 2004,
409). Furthermore, the home secretary could withhold support from applicants
who could not provide an account of how they had arrived in the United King-
dom, how they had been living since their arrival, or to anyone who did not
cooperate with the authorities. The Refugee Council raised concerns that this
would potentially push thousands of asylum applicants in the United Kingdom
into extreme poverty making it more difficult to pursue their asylum applica-
tion, forcing them to choose between persecution or destitution (Sales 2005). In
2004, the Court of Appeal found that the policy of denying support to destitute
asylum seekers breached Article 3 of the ECHR and in October 2004 the home
secretary abandoned the policy (Callaghan 2004).
In view of the criticism of the 2002 Act, new legislation was mooted, which
the Home Office claimed would introduce “speed and finality to the appeals
and removals process and ensure traffickers and asylum claimants do not bene-
fit from dishonesty or by attempting to mislead the authorities” (The Guardian
2009b). The primary aim of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claim-
ants) Act of 2004 was to limit the role of courts in immigration appeals replac-
ing the earlier system of immigration adjudicators and the IAT with a single-
tier asylum and immigration tribunal. Controversially, it also removed judicial
review, cutting off all appeals to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords
except in cases that involve an error of law. The government justified this single
tier of appeal as seeking to deter legal advisers from abusing the system while
failing the claimant and enabling the government to deport failed asylum
seekers “without further judicial interference” (Blair 2003).
Second, the single-tier system was also justified on the basis that the appeals suc-
ceed in only a small percentage of cases, and the changes would prevent asylum
seekers from trying to “play the system” in order to remain in the United Kingdom
(House of Commons 2003). This was in tandem with the governments crackdown
on asylum seekers who deliberately destroy or discard their travel documents (Mul-
vey 2010). It created criminal sanctions to punish people who arrive in the United
Kingdom without a valid travel document unless they have a reasonable excuse not
to have one or will not cooperate with the authorities to get new travel documents
when their claims fail. The government claimed that more than 60 percent of asylum
seekers had no documents and that this was the single biggest barrier to dealing with
their applications and returning them to their country of origin if their claim failed
(House of Commons 2003). The Refugee Council noted the Act was “a worrying
trend within the United Kingdoms asylum procedures of judging an asylum appli-
cation by looking at how an individual came to claim asylum rather than why they
had to flee” (The Guardian 2009b).
The Act also empowered the authorities to refuse welfare support to failed
asylum seekers with dependents, the children would be supported but could be
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removed from their parents (Mulvey 2010). Enforcement authorities were also
allowed to tag, track, and use voice recognition technology to trace asylum
seekers (House of Commons 2003). It also made the provision of accommoda-
tion to failed asylum seekers who cannot return home immediately conditional
upon the participation in community activities. It replaced back payments of
income support and related benefits to refugees with a loans system. It also tar-
geted “sham marriages” requiring foreign nationals from outside the European
Economic Area to get written permission from the Home Office before getting
married in Britain (Bosworth and Guild 2008). In 2007, the government lost its
appeal against an earlier court ruling that its “sham marriages” provisions were
unlawful, as no certificate was required for those who wished to marry in the
Church of England (Summers 2007). Like the 2002 Act, the 2004 Act raised
serious concerns about the decision to refuse support to asylum seekers with
minor dependants and was seen as breaching Article 8 of the ECHR because it
forces “parents to choose between keeping children with them on the streets or
asking a local authority to provide the children with accommodation on their
own” (The Guardian 2009a).
Following the 2004 Act, the Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act of
2006 sought to implement the key legislative aspects of the Home Offices five-
year strategy for asylum and immigration. It sought to further reform the immi-
gration and asylum system, building on and amending the measures introduced
in the Immigration Acts of 1999, 2002, and 2004 (The Guardian 2009a). It fur-
ther restricted appeal for those refused entry to the United Kingdom to work or
study. Only asylum refusals made in Britain carry a full right of appeal. It fur-
ther empowered immigration officers to confiscate travel documents and record
and verify biometric information from people entering the United Kingdom. It
enlarged powers for the police to obtain advanced information on passengers
and crew or freight ships and aircraft arriving, expected to arrive, leaving, or
expected to leave the United Kingdom. The Act required that asylum is refused
to anyone who has carried out or has encouraged others to “commit, prepare
or instigate terrorism” (The Guardian 2009a). It expanded powers for the home
secretary to certify that a person shall be excluded from protection under the
convention relating to the status of refugees if they are deemed to be a terrorist
or major criminal. The Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act of 2009
retained the governments policy on the detention of child asylum seekers but
also required the U.K. Border Agency and private contractors to promote the
welfare of children in line with Section 11 of the Childrens Act 2004 (Kelly and
Bokhari 2012).
From 2010: Era of “Open Hostility”
Policy enactments under the Cameron and May governments further inten-
sified and accelerated patterns laid down by their predecessors. The 1996 Act
had removed asylum seekers from the mainstream benefit system and created a
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parallel system of support run by a division of the Home Office. In the era of
austerity the most vulnerable were subjected to further budget cuts and many
of those eking out a highly marginal existence were left destitute and homeless,
and children were particularly hard hit by the cuts (Refugee Action 2017). The
2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts were intended to “create a hostile environ-
ment” (Travis 2013) by expanding border controls in Britain in everyday life
activities by requiring banks, driving licenses, hospitals, and landlords to do
basic immigration checks. The intention was to restrict access to work, shelter,
health care, and education (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2017). At the
same time, the United Kingdom ring-fenced the development aid budget used
in part to support the humanitarian work of the UN in refugee camps in Africa
and the Middle East (Ibrahim and Howarth 2017). Principles first introduced in
1987 and strengthened in 1999 which held carriers legally accountable for the
inadvertent transportation of illegal migrants were extended to other economic
activities making the employment of, or renting to, an illegal migrant a criminal
offence. The governments “deport first, appeal later” scheme was extended to
all migrants unless it would cause them “serious irreversible harm” (Partos and
Bale 2015). In addition, visa restrictions were tightened in specifying how much
U.K. nationals had to earn before they could bring over a non-European Union
spouse, children, or elderly parents in need of care (Travis 2017).
The 2016 Act restricted the detention of pregnant women to 72 hours and
included the so-called “Dubs Amendment” on unaccompanied refugee children
in the European Union. The amendment, which initially had widespread public
and media backing (McLaughlin 2017), required the government to accept unac-
companied children already in the European Union (including in Calais) but pro-
vided for discretion as to how many children were admitted and a cut-off point
for eligibility. Britain was already required under the Dublin Regulations to
allow minors already in the European Union and with close family ties in Britain
to enter before applying for asylum. The United Kingdom, however, dragged its
feet in accepting unaccompanied children, particularly in Calais (Ibrahim and
Howarth 2018). The government also consistently refused to accept unaccompa-
nied children with no family ties unless they were Syrian refugees in the UN
camps in North Africa (Wintour 2015). Rather than face parliamentary defeat,
the government allowed the amendment to go through unopposed (Asthana,
Mason, and McVeigh 2016). Nevertheless, the implementation of the Dubs
Amendment and the Dublin Regulations on children was heavily criticized as
wholly inadequate when the informal camps in Calais were demolished and Brit-
ain exhibited reticence in accepting these displaced children (Rogers 2017).
Analysis: A Hollowing out of Humanitarian Refuge
while Retaining the Myth
Our historic overview of legislative activity traced the emergence of a
“distinctive” British tradition of humanitarian refuge from the nineteenth
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century, a period of open borders that coincided with a new secular morality
centered on the human in relation to the state to the unapologetically hostile
environment of the 2016 Immigration Act. Three themes emerge from the over-
view. First, the emergence of a romanticized ideal of a British “tradition” and
its subsequent effacement with racialized distinctions between the deserving
and undeserving. Second, the cumulative erosion of welfare support reducing—
particularly the unsuccessful—asylum seeker to destitution and deportation.
And third, the proliferation of legislative activity from 2000 that created a sense
of a system in perpetual “crisis” (Mulvey 2010). These justified more draconian
measures in an escalating spiral of hostility toward migration and the seeking
of asylum, coalescing the approaches between the two categories.
The absence of border controls until the 1905 Aliens Act was necessary but
insufficient for the emergence of refuge as a humanitarian category and “moral
norm” (Shaw 2015, 6, 7) or for a sense of a British distinctiveness because much
of Europe only began reinstating border controls during the course of the nine-
teenth century (Bashford and McAdam 2014). The differentiation in a political
and public imagining arose out of a comparative lack of restrictive new laws or
discrimination based on politics or religion and the refusal to concede to
demands by other European states to extradite revolutionaries. The perception
of Britain as a unique space of sanctuary unmediated by political or religious
discrimination was shared across Europe from the 1850s (Rabben 2011; Shaw
2015). In Victorian Britain, it chimed with a sense of the nations evolution into
the most morally superior and enlightened in Europe.
The notion of the vulnerable human in need of protection has ancient roots,
the difference being that by the Victorian era the “human” had become the central
moral figure in refuge while in ancient and medieval sanctuary God/the gods were.
The protection offered to those in need was by the morally upright rather than out
of fear of God/the gods and the discretion to grant refuge was until relatively
recently exercised by ministers rather than bishops. The humanitarian sentiment
did not displace ancient and medieval understandings of sanctuary so much as
reconstitute them into modern secular notions of humanitarian refuge. Parliament
had formally abolished church sanctuary in 1624 but the practices continued infor-
mally into the eighteenth century. The evolution of sanctuary practices into a more
secular form in the nineteenth century melded the religious notion of sacred space
with Kantian meanings of humanitarianism. The latter emerged from a moral
imperative to alleviate human suffering, delineating the distinctive role of the
nation state in offering humanitarian refuge within its borders to those fleeing war,
conflict, and persecution. In Victorian Britain, the idea of a distinctive tradition of
humanitarian refuge was a powerful social force in that the public and media imag-
ining of the tradition took it for granted that those seeking refuge would not be
turned away (Rabben 2011). Despite the lofty ideals and self-image of superior
moral standing in Victorian Britain, in reality while exiles were free to stay, many
starved in conditions of destitution and the government sent the unwanted, at times
secretly funding their passage, to the colonies (Rabben 2011, 61).
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The historic trajectory of humanitarian refuge as a Victorian ideal was nev-
ertheless disrupted by global developments, briefly resurrected with the interna-
tional treaties on refugees, and then eroded in Britain by the stigmatizing of
refugees. The first development was the emergence of mass forced displacement
beginning with the flight of the Ashkenazi Jews in the 1880s, reaching unprece-
dented levels in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in two world wars, the
breakup of empires and federations in Europe, and culminating in the contem-
porary refugee crisis. The second was the loss of an empire, which had two
implications for the British tradition. The government could no longer send
unwanted refugees to the colonies as a mechanism of exclusion while still hold-
ing to the ideal of humanitarian refuge. Ministers also feared a large influx of
the formerly colonized fleeing postliberation war, persecution, and torture, and
from the 1960s the government steadily legislated to restrict the entry of com-
monwealth citizens. The cumulative legislative responses to these developments
progressively effaced the practices of humanitarian refuge and tightened border
controls, truncating the latter as part of increased state securitization particu-
larly after 9/11. These culminated into open conflict and brutalizing policies
toward the figure of the refugee.
The refugee protections inserted into the Aliens Act of 1905 did not survive
the outbreak of World War I or the influx of Jewish refugees from Nazism, a
development that retriggered the xenophobic arguments that circulated during
the 1904 debate on the Aliens Bill (London 2003). Nevertheless, a variant of
these was reinstalled in legislation after World War II. What remained from the
1905 Act and shaped the policy imperative and legislative activity for the next
120 years was intense racialization of immigration policies with the withdrawal
of Britain from its colonies and the coalescing of immigration control with asy-
lum policies resulting in an overt stigmatization of the refugee as an opportunist
who would deplete the coffers of the United Kingdom and its welfare system.
The erosion of the states responsibility toward the displaced and persecuted
meant that Britains notion of humanitarianism was increasingly envisaged
through a reduced commitment to the provision of refuge and the management
of forced displacement through an externalization approach which relegated
border control to other countries (Ibrahim and Howarth 2017).
While anti-Semitism shaped the distinction between the wanted and
unwanted, it did not appear on the face of the 1905 Act, but such inhibitions
evaporated from the 1960s in an escalating politics of race. There were wider
social tensions around immigration from the former colonies and fears that the
displaced from the newly liberated colonies or the opportunistic attracted by
the new welfare state would “flood” into Britain. Right-wing political rhetoric
tapped into atavistic fears of being overwhelmed numerically and by racial, cul-
tural and ideological differences “portending the demise” of a valued way of
life (Bauman 2016, 1). The tensions ignited into several race riots between the
late 1950s and early 1980s. Rationales for some legislative activity from the
1960s were clearly racially motivated (Dembour 2015) but one of the key
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rationales for legislating on asylum provided by the 1997 Blair government was
a concern with managing race relations, an issue of public order (Maughan
2010).
A key instrument in the hollowing out of humanitarian refuge was the
revival of distinctions between the deserving and the undeserving where these
often intersected with race, religion, and ethnicity. In Medieval and Reforma-
tion Europe, the distinctions were religious or criminal rather than racial, in
Revolutionary Europe, they were political, while in Britain after 1905, they
became racialized—at times overlapping with fear of the Jews and Muslims—
and increasingly pejorative. The specification of the “undesirable” as criminals,
diseased, and destitute which plastered a fig leaf over the racism in the 1905 Ali-
ens Act morphed in the 1971 and 1981 Acts into new overt racial categorizing
of “patrials” and “nonpatrials.” From the 1990s, racism shifted from a catego-
rization of racial difference based on parentage into a rhetoric of “genuine” ver-
sus “bogus” asylum seeker which reconfigured asylum seekers not as heroic
figures or objects of pity but as the fraudulent and criminal posing a risk to the
society that hosted them. The rhetoric and the illogic underpinning it were
rebuked by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2014, saying: “[l]et us remem-
ber that a bogus asylum-seeker it not equivalent to a criminal; and that an
unsuccessful asylum application is not equivalent to a bogus one” (UNHCR
2014).
Domestically, the dichotomizing of the deserving and undeserving served
two purposes beyond fragmenting asylum seekers as a category and stigmatiz-
ing most. The “deserving” granted refugee status allowed for a continuation of
the romantic ideal of humanitarian refuge and a sense of compliance with inter-
national agreements. The criminalizing of the “undeserving” made it possible
to reconstitute them, not as objects of pity as they had been in Victorian era of
humanitarian refuge, but suspect figures either smuggled into Britain through
complicity with criminal networks, or as opportunistic parasites on the welfare
system, or as economic migrants fraudulently claiming to have been persecuted.
The shifting of terms between the “migrant” and the “refugee” meant these
became blurred categories reducing a moral caution in approaching the dis-
placed or those at risk.
From the 1980s, the domestic agenda on asylum began to incorporate some
of the more coercive of European Union directives unmediated by the protec-
tive elements. Brutalizing and dehumanizing technologies were deployed such
as dispersal around the country and containment in detention centers, deporta-
tion to where they first entered the European Union, to their country of origin,
or a third country. None of these were unique to Britain but the intensity with
which they were implemented was manifest in the material consequences of a
dramatic expansion in Britains detention estate into one of the largest in
Europe (Silverman and Hajela 2015). Another consequence of taking asylum
seekers out of the mainstream welfare system in 1996 was that it made the
Home Office responsible for their financial support. Welfare support became a
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punitive technology of dehumanizing and degradation in systematic strategy
intended to cut the number of asylum applications and increase deportations.
The worst affected were those whose claims had been refused and were sub-
jected to what NGOs called “forced, state-sanctioned absolute poverty”
(ONeill 2017) and many of the mainly invisible were driven into destitution,
prostitution, and modern slavery (Webber 2008). NGOs labeled it a “starve
them out” strategy based on the false premise that people would return to war
zones, persecution, and torture if they are denied food and shelter in the United
Kingdom (Blanchard and Joy 2017).
The distinctive British tradition of humanitarian refuge had become a shell.
The three central tenets of the romantic ideal—lack of restrictive laws, nondis-
crimination, and the refusal to extradite or deport—had all but disappeared
within just over a century. Zygmunt Bauman (2016) has suggested that stigma-
tizing the stranger who comes in search of sanctuary is a rhetorical device to
negotiate dissonance between the ideals of humanitarian refuge and the increas-
ing harshness of the response. Reconfiguring the refugee as a suspect figure ena-
bles a reconfiguring of space, from one of hospitality to hostility. Mulvey
(2010) argues that in presenting asylum seekers as unwanted and constantly
subsumed through legislative activity, the Blair government conveyed an asy-
lum system in perpetual crisis. The visceral politics followed the policies as the
government lost control of the debate and the hostility it helped foster in the
media and public sphere. The outcome was a “vicious cycle of hostility” (Mul-
vey 2010, 456) which our analysis of the Conservative government of 2010 sug-
gests is still spiraling and made manifest through fragmented and short-term
solutions to the humanitarian crisis in Europe. While the Ancient Greeks had
feared the vengeance of the gods if sanctuary was refused, British political lead-
ers from Blair to May have feared the revenge of voters at elections over
“uncontrolled” immigration. Where Victorian governments had feared the gov-
ernment would fall if sanctuary was refused, the contemporary fear is that the
government could fall if migration and asylum seeker numbers are not tightly
controlled and regulated (Maughan 2010).
The European Union and Externalization of Border Controls
While the six phases discussed earlier outline the approach toward immigra-
tion and asylum in the United Kingdom, Britains entanglement with the Euro-
pean community and the European Union produced renewed tensions
concerning immigration through the expansion of the European Union and the
admission, in particular, of Eastern European member states such as Poland,
Romania, and Bulgaria. Anxieties over the inclusion of new Eastern European
states were reflected in newspaper discourses and often became part of election
debate. More significantly, they circulated the resonant discourses concerning
the United Kingdom being attractive to these new states due to its welfare sys-
tem (Ibrahim and Howarth 2016).
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Britain joined the European Community in 1973 amidst a perceived risk
that the demise of the empire would lead to a loss of markets and marginaliza-
tion in a globalizing world. Despite this union, closer ties to Europe produced
sustained anxieties concerning the European Union being a threat to British
sovereignty and identity based on Britains spatial separation as an island and
equally its historical and racial distinctiveness (Daddow 2013; Wall 2012). With
the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 the Community was turned into a Union (i.e.,
from a predominantly trading block to a more political entity with looser inter-
nal borders). France and the United Kingdom reached an agreement to place
juxtaposed controls (i.e., immigration checks) at designated cross-Channel sites,
including at Coquelles near Calais. These controls meant checks took place
before boarding a train or ferry rather than on arrival. In 1995, the Schengen
Agreement was signed allowing for the removal of internal borders between sig-
natory states with the purpose of further facilitating the efficient movement of
people. Britain, choosing neither to cede its sovereignty or identity, opted out
of the Schengen Agreement.
The borders of the European Union have been fluid, with six waves of
enlargement. In 1973, it moved westward with the inclusion of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, in the 1980s it pushed southward to the Mediterranean
to Greece, in the 1990s, northward to encompass some of Scandinavia, and
eastward after the new millennium to include Hungary and Croatia, bringing
the total number of member states to 28. Membership also brought access to
new markets and led to mobility of labor. Migration issues had become highly
politicized in most western European states from the 1980s onward, and politi-
cal parties were competing for electoral support with promises to restrict
“unwanted” migration. Two major migration narratives have dominated Brit-
ish public debate since the 1990s: loss of control over borders and the economic
threat of migration through expansion of European Union membership. The
expansion of the European Union to include Poland in 2004 and Bulgaria and
Romania in 2007 produced much anxiety concerning migrants from these coun-
tries threatening job security, welfare services, national identity, and sover-
eignty (Darian-Smith 1999; Sellar et al. 2009).
The breakup of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, and the former Yugo-
slavia in the 1990s shifted the dominant discourse away from rights, protection,
and refuge to threats posed by “unregulated, unaccountable population shifts”
to the political stability and cohesion of the states (Bosworth 2008). From the
late 1990s, there has also been growing concern about people trafficking and
smuggling and, after 9/11, about the possibility of terrorists infiltrating the asy-
lum seeker—migrant routes. Intense cooperation with the European Union
meant shared offshore immigration controls and pre-inspection, participation
in European Union measures to police the Mediterranean through Frontex—
the European Union agency tasked with coordinating border security—opera-
tions, schemes for offshore processing, and fines on carriers that bring individu-
als without documents to the United Kingdom.
374 | POLITICS & POLICY / June 2018
From the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the externalization of border control,
restrictive asylum systems, and cooperation to combat migrant smuggling and
trafficking were effective instruments for curtailing migration. The loss of
national control over borders created the perceived need for “flanking” measures
between European Union countries and a range of extraterritorial migration con-
trol measures with countries of origin and transit countries in recent years. The
external dimension of European Union immigration and asylum policy was nev-
ertheless only formally embraced by the European Council in October 1999. This
externalization approach has meant cooperation with migrant-sending countries
and the “transit” countries through which migrants and refugees travel.
This externalization approach entails more intensive cooperation with
countries of origin and/or transit countries and involves the exportation of tra-
ditional migration control instruments to transit countries outside the European
Union. These instruments encompass border control, measures to combat ille-
gal migration, smuggling and trafficking, and capacity building of asylum sys-
tems and migration management in transit countries. The second element of
externalization comprises a series of provisions for facilitating the return of asy-
lum seekers and illegal migrants to third countries. These involve readmission
agreements with third countries, committing them to readmit irregular immi-
grants who had passed through their territory into European Union countries,
or were their nationals. Other provisions on safe third countries allowed Euro-
pean Union states to return asylum seekers to countries from which they came
or through which they had passed which were considered “safe.” These third
countries were obliged to apply European Union standards of migration man-
agement, or to enter agreements for readmitting irregular migrants. Justice and
home affairs officials were keen to transfer national control mechanisms not
just to the European Union level, but further afield. Nevertheless, these mea-
sures raise serious concerns about the legality and ethics of denying refugees the
right to seek asylum, and equally the acceptability of passing on the U.K.s asy-
lum “burden” to other—often poorer—states closer to regions of refugee origin
(Gibney 2004; McAdam 2008).
The Contemporary Refugee Crisis
The effacing of humanitarian refuge at home was accompanied by contract-
ing humanitarianism abroad in a way that enabled the government to maintain
the semblance of a British tradition. Cameron and May accelerated and hard-
ened hierarchies of legitimacy which distinguished between those deserving and
undeserving of pity, those for whom state-funded humanitarian assistance was
targeted and those for whom it was denied unless provided by the voluntary
sector. Mays time at the Home Office had marked further restrictions and mar-
ginalization of asylum seekers in measures that critics viewed as “nasty,”
“vindictive” (Sheikh 2016), and racialized, intended to deter those seeking
humanitarian refuge from coming to the United Kingdom in the first place.
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Unsurprisingly, the responses to the unfolding humanitarian crisis in North
Africa, the Mediterranean, and Calais seek to keep refugees at a distance and
control who could enter Britain. Mays “vision” was most clearly outlined in one
of her first major speeches as prime minister. She proposed a “new global
approach to migration” based on three fundamental principles: ensuring refugees
claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, improving how to distinguish
between refugees and economic migrants, and a “better overall approach” to
managing economic migration based on the premise that “all countries have the
right to control their borders. . . [and to] commit to accepting the return of their
own nationals when they have no right to remain elsewhere” (May 2016).
Given the growing hostility toward asylum in the United Kingdom, David
Cameron and Theresa May were lukewarm in their responses to the mounting
crises in the Mediterranean and Calais. Critics argue that their resistance to
take in refugees constituted an “abandonment of the United Kingdoms
humanitarian traditions” (Borger 2015). Stung by the criticism, Cameron and
May reiterated the British governments humanitarian imperative that privi-
leged Syrian refugees who had fled to neighboring countries and UN camps as
opposed to those who had undertaken the treacherous journey to cross the
Mediterranean. While the Syrians remained in their immediate neighboring
regions, the British government considered them refugees deserving of pity. By
January 2016, the United Kingdom had committed £1.12 billion to support the
humanitarian work of the UN and the governments of Lebanon and Jordan,
including £23 million for the UN to distribute aid on the ground to “help the
most vulnerable in the hardest-to-reach parts of Syria” (May 2016). The United
Kingdom operated on the assumption that if the needs and aspirations of refu-
gees were met in the region, the refugees were less likely to migrate to Europe
(May 2015b). They also vetted the “most vulnerable” in the UN camps and
granted them safe passage and “sanctuary” in Britain (Cameron 2015). The ref-
uge element of the U.K. humanitarian response remains highly regulated and
guarded, retaining it through a protocol of tight controls and externalization of
border controls and processing of applications.
The foreign policy responses also reiterated the racialization and criminali-
zation of asylum seekers that characterized 120 years of domestic policy mak-
ing. Cameron and May privileged the taking of Syrian refugees from the UN
camps but made no mention of doing likewise for Eritreans, Somalians, Iraqis,
or Afghans (Ibrahim and Howarth 2017). Those that left the region and risked
their lives crossing the Mediterranean were relabeled “migrants” and seen as
both victims preyed upon by the criminal smuggling networks taking them
across the sea and complicit in risking their lives and those of their children to
get to Europe (Craig 2015). Deemed less deserving of pity once they left the
region, the U.K.s policy imperative for the Mediterranean emphasized disrupt-
ing people smuggling on the European Unions southern borders, with the
Royal Navys ships deployed primarily for that purpose rather than attending
to the trauma of forced migration (Ibrahim and Howarth 2017). The
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government, in a tone of rectitude, held tightly to the precept in the Dublin
Regulation that those “migrants” that landed in the European Union were
expected to apply for asylum in the first country they set foot in. While
exercising their opt-out from European asylum directives in refusing to take
refugees from within the European Union, the United Kingdom made a ges-
ture of support for its counterparts in Greece, Spain, and Italy by sending
technical experts and translators to reception “hotspots” to assist with the
processing of claims in the hope that most would apply there. However, those
displaced who delayed with a view to applying for asylum in Britain and trav-
eled to Calais to attempt to do so, were deemed by the government to be
“illegal migrants,” and British “investment” was targeted at augmenting secu-
rity measures and border patrols (May 2015a) intended to obstruct them from
achieving their objective of reaching Britain. This label of illegal migrant nar-
rated these displaced bodies through an illegitimacy not deserving of either
sympathy or taxpayers money.
This crude categorizing of the displaced through forced migration illus-
trated Mays bifurcation of the humanitarian imperative, directing it
“upstream” with the intention of keeping refugees in the region (May 2015a)
while “downstream” in Calais the securitization imperative sought to actively
discourage new “illegal migrants” to the area and obstruct entry to Britain. The
spatial categorizations also served to justify the distinction between the deserv-
ing and the undeserving, but it also cast into sharp relief the nature of con-
tracted humanitarianism and the U.K.s nonproximate approach of keeping
refugees away from its borders.
The Dubs Amendment, while framed widely to include unaccompanied or
lone children anywhere in the European Union, was primarily targeted at those
in Calais. British public opinion has been hardening against migration and asy-
lum seekers for decades and the government felt able after the 2009 demolition
of the “jungle” (i.e., makeshift refugee camps) in Calais to refuse admitting chil-
dren despite pressure from NGOs to do so. In 2016, reports began to emerge
from the UN that 25,846 unaccompanied children, orphans, and those sepa-
rated from their family, had entered the European Union and were vulnerable
to exploitation and trafficking (UNHCR 2017). Nevertheless, mounting public
pressure, political opposition, and media discourses of children living in ditches
or flimsy tents or simply disappearing with the demolition of the jungle raised
alarm in the public domain. As representatives from across the political spec-
trum, media, and public opinion lobbied for an exception to be made for child
refugees, Cameron agreed that the government would not oppose the Dubs
Amendment but would retain discretion on the numbers allowed in, based on
what local councils said they could afford, and placed a restriction on when the
child entered the European Union. Notwithstanding legislative provisions for
two categories of children (i.e., those with close families and those unaccompa-
nied) to apply for asylum in Britain, there were lengthy delays in implementing
the measures.
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With the present refugee crisis in Europe, humanitarian work was out-
sourced in Calais to voluntary organizations, and in North Africa to the UN.
While refusing to accept refugees from within the European Union generally or
Calais specifically in 2014, the government under mounting public pressure rel-
ented to accept 20,000 “vulnerable” Syrian “refugees” from UN camps in Leb-
anon, Jordan, and Turkey (Brokenshire 2014). In 2015, within weeks after the
image of Alan Kurdi went viral, the Ministerial Committee for Syrian Refugees
was set up and a special post of Minister for Syrian Refugees was created in the
Home Office (Cameron and May 2015). Only a chosen few, vetted by the UN
and the Home Office before they got to Europe, were offered refuge based on
those the government deemed to be “most in need,” including children and
those most likely to be granted refugee status in Britain. This “upstream”
response to the humanitarian crisis of offering refuge sanctuary to those vetted
outside the European Union was an integral part of the U.K.s nonproximate
approach in delimiting the humanitarian imperative to outside the borders of
the European Union.
From the Aliens Act to the Present Refugee Crisis
Our review of policies from the mid-1800s to the Aliens Act of 1905 shows
that the fatigued contemporary figures of the refugee and asylum seeker are his-
torical conceptions born from a romantic and moral ideal of sanctuary and ref-
uge which over time descend into a shattered myth. The road from civilized
hospitality to hostility is a story of curtailment where the “recourse to funds”
caveat introduced with the Aliens Act produces a carte blanche in policy terms to
constantly review the terms of sanctuary and refuge. What it gives way to is a
politics of attrition where the terms of reference in enabling refugee or asylum
seeker status are scrutinized through the lens of these entities depleting the cof-
fers, and in the process, they become suspect bodies apparently bent on exploiting
the welfare system in the United Kingdom. The interchangeable terminologies
between migrant and refugee in political discourses locate them through oppor-
tunism rather than highlighting the risks and trauma they should be protected
from. The policy review from the Aliens Act points to an intense process of cur-
tailment in terms of numbers and disciplining the vulnerable through policy para-
digms, particularly in severing historical ties to the colonies and introducing new
legislation to requalify the right to citizenship through descent.
The promulgation of the Aliens Act in 1905 retained the notion of refuge
but the passage of the Bill witnessed extreme racialized discourses concerning
who should be admitted and who should not. This racialization of migration
both in political discourse and in practice would ensue for years to come from
the demise of the empire, the expansion of the European Union, the fallout
from Brexit, to the present-day humanitarian crisis. Most significantly, the Ali-
ens Act enshrined in law the category of the refugee, and conjoined immigra-
tion with welfare, specifically the notion of “recourse to public funds.” The
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retention of the Enlightenment ideals and mythic elements of refuge within the
policy paradigm and the conjoining of welfare with the immigrant would lead
to more than 100 years of policy making which would not only be severely
racialized with the crumbling of empire, but one which would slide into the
harsh politics of curtailment—of bodies, liberties, and funding. The historical
discourses of hospitality and magnanimity symbolizing a civilized and enlight-
ened polity would over time be confronted with xenophobic anxieties and also
a domestic politics of depletion of welfare through the movement of refugees
and asylum seekers into the United Kingdom. The provision of refuge becomes
a politics of controlling, disciplining, and curbing the refugee body through pol-
icy enactments while retaining the refuge for the persecuted as a romantic ideal.
The notion of human rights, particularly with regard to the refugee and asylum
seeker, became a malleable category. Despite being a signatory to the 1951
Geneva Convention and the ECHR (1953), these would only be integrated into
British domestic law in 2000.
The tight control of immigration, particularly from the Commonwealth
from the 1960s, and the racialization of immigration through exclusion based
on the notion of patriality and the replacement of citizenship through descent
rather than place of birth were a manifest racialization of immigration policies,
both as a measure and symbol of whom they admitted and bestowed citizenship
rights to. The Queen as the protector of the empire gave way to policies which
sought to reduce the U.K.s obligations to its former colonies. In the 1990s, the
ambit of policy making focused on asylum and would remain an area of tension
and criticism in terms of party politics for subsequent Labour and Conservative
governments and as an emotive election issue, with refugees portrayed as
exploiting not just welfare benefits but core British values. Successive govern-
ments would lobby for the change of the asylum system arguing that it was not
fit for purpose given the increasing number of claimants. The asylum seekers
recourse to public funds is an arena of visceral politics, often igniting criticisms
concerning the U.K.s “soft touch” and casting renewed doubts over the “bogus
asylum seeker” and the United Kingdom being a magnet for these suspect fig-
ures due to its generous welfare provisions. The enactments to regulate the asy-
lum seeker, from the 1993 Immigration Act to the Dubs Amendment in 2016,
would seek to increase the powers of authorities while tightly controlling the
asylum seekers citizenship rights and civil liberties with respect to employment,
accommodation, subsistence, right of appeal, detention, and deportation. Since
9/11 increased securitization and terrorism have converged with the suspect fig-
ure of the “refugee and asylum seeker” not just posting threats to the benefit
system but cultural and security risks too.
The U.K.s membership of the European Community and the European
Union produced new forms of tension in terms of European migration into the
United Kingdom and the need to comply with the ECHR. The United King-
dom opted out of the Schengen Agreement that entailed the systematic aboli-
tion of the internal border controls and a common visa policy, choosing instead
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to retain control over its own borders. The addition of new member states in
Eastern Europe would similarly produce paranoia in the media and public dis-
course concerning migration and the claiming of welfare benefits. Membership
of the European Union would see intense cooperation in offshore immigration
controls and the externalization of border control through Frontex. The exter-
nalization of border control through “flanking” measures through a range of
extraterritorial migration control initiatives with countries of origin and transit
countries in recent years has enabled the United Kingdom to distance itself
from the humanitarian crises. In effect it has put the onus on migrant-sending
countries and the “transit” countries through which migrants and refugees
travel to process and control forced migration from conflict zones. This non-
proximate approach of externalization and outsourcing to third parties raises
grave concerns about the legality and ethics of managing the figure of the refu-
gee and asylum seeker and passing on the burden to other often less economi-
cally powerful countries.
Equally the outsourcing of humanitarian work to NGOs in Calais, and mea-
sures to retain Syrian refugees in the region and to process them through UN
camps equally reiterates the nonproximate approach where refugees closer to the
border are treated as migrants rather than refugees. The shifting of the U.K.s
imperative in the Mediterranean from “search and rescue” to disrupting human
smuggling highlights the U.K.s contracting humanitarianism. Their approach of
open hostility, particularly under Mays regime, marks the demise of humanitari-
anism where aid is meant to retain refugees in the region rather than crossing over
to Europe. The crossover into the borders of Europe and the United Kingdom del-
egitimizes them as opportunistic migrants rather than refugees in need of protec-
tion and hospitality.
Conclusion
We have argued that the emergence of a distinctive British tradition of
humanitarian refuge enabled the nation to imagine itself as morally superior to
its European counterparts. The tradition was a mix of practices and ideals,
more romanticized than reality, that have been severely tested by the challenges
of mass forced migration in the twentieth century and the loss of empire. The
legislative responses to these challenges have contested these ideals in practice.
The contracting of humanitarian refuge and the focus on financial aid and sup-
port for the work in UN camps provided a means to retain Britains compas-
sionate façade in the global stage despite not admitting its quota of refugees in
the recent crisis. The vetting of potential asylum seekers in the camps by the
UN and Home Office officials meant that these camps could legitimize harsher
measures against those who had encroached their borders in Europe and to
retain a policy of managing refugees through nonproximate initiatives.
The refugee as a suspect figure mired completely in the domestic politics of
depletion emerges through waves of policy enactments where both Labour and
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Conservative governments outdo each other to reform an asylum system which
is deemed not fit for its purpose in view of burgeoning numbers. The nation is
seen as being besieged through its “soft touch.” With the closing of borders to
international migration from the colonies in the 1960s, the ambit of policy
focuses intensely on the refugee and the asylum seeker as burdens on the state
echoing similar reservations with the implementation of the Aliens Act. From
the 1990s, the immigration policy imperative shifted from comprehensive policy
making to curtailment, controlling the numbers, and curbing civil and human
rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Positioned through the domestic politics
of depletion they are perceived not as vulnerable people at risk, but suspect and
opportunistic figures who pose a threat to the culture and economic security of
the nation state. The provision of aid away from British shores and the
increased externalization of border controls coupled with the shifting discourses
which transform refugees into migrants as they reach the borders of Europe
and the United Kingdom, means the romance and ideal of the sanctuary
becomes a hollowed-out rhetoric, yet one which is constantly evoked to retain
the glory of the empire and its attendant imagination of itself as a civilized
entity. The refugee and asylum seeker are boundary objects productive for
invoking in the collective British imagination the idea of the United Kingdom
as uniquely humanitarian. In reality they are inscribed through the violent and
visceral politics of immigration and its politics of depletion.
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